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South Dakota v. Dole: A Study in
Conditional Spending and Missed
Opportunity
Over the past fifty years, federal spending has iixcreascJ in magni-
tude and influence. ' Federal grants and subsidies to the states have re-
cently reached the ninety-six billion dollar mark, accounting for
approximately one-fifth of all state and local government spending.2 Yet
this staggering escalation in federal beneficence does not come cost-free
to the states. Federal appropriations are often conditioned on state com-
pliance with other congressionally imposed provisos.3
This "conditional spending" by the federal government creates a
tension between two fundamental principles of constitutional federalism:
the express power of Congress to spend for "the general welfare,"4 and
the interests of state autonomy. The areas over which Congress possesses
legislative authority are enumerated in Article I, section 8 of the Consti-
tution;5 powers not granted to the federal government are reserved to the
states.6 In 1936, however, the Supreme Court held that the spending
1. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv.
1103, 1103-04 (1987).
2. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-53 (1985) (citing
authorities).
3. Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1104. Federal appropriations for educational institutions,
welfare benefits, and health programs are among those to which conditions are frequently
attached. See Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92
HARv. L. Rv. 879, 891-96 (1979); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with
Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Trezise, Emerging Concepts of Federalisn:
Limitations on the Spending Power and National Health Planning, 34 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
1133 (1977).
4. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see infra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
5. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrrTIONAL LAW 298-305 (2nd ed. 1988);
Note, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 293,
297 (1975). Several constitutional amendments also grant Congress legislative power. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2; amend. XVI, amend. XVIII
(concurrently with the states), amend. XIX; amend. XX, § 4; amend. XXIII, § 2; amend.
XXIV, § 2.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
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power is not limited by these enumerated boundaries.7 Since the condi-
tions that Congress attaches to its grants are considered to be incidental
to the spending power, these conditions have also been freed from the
limitations of Article I, section 8.8
Conditional appropriations conflict with the interests of state auton-
omy when Congress attempts to accomplish through its conditions what
it could not enact directly. 9 Although the states are free to reject the
conditional grant, the increasing dependence of state and local govern-
ments on federal funding frequently makes this option unrealistic.'0
States have argued, with little success, that the conditional spending
power effectively allows Congress to circumvent its legislative boundaries
and unconstitutionally compel state action."
In South Dakota v. Dole,"* the Supreme Court re-examined Con-
gress' power to condition funds while considering a statute that required
recipient states either to raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one
or to suffer partial forfeiture of federal highway funds. The Court upheld
Congress' use of the conditional spending power and advanced several
criteria for its proper use. This Comment will examine the Court's deci-
sion and explore its implications for conditional spending. Part I sets out
the historical background of the conditional spending power; Part II dis-
cusses the factual and legal background of South Dakota v. Dole in the
lower courts; Part III details the Supreme Court's treatment of the case;
and Part IV analyzes the "general restrictions" on the conditional spend-
ing power discussed by the majority. This Comment argues for more
restrictive parameters on conditional spending than those imposed by the
majority in Dole. To that end, Part IV also considers the merits of a
standard proposed by the dissent for determining what conditions should
be permitted under the federal spending power.
I. Historical Background: The Spending Clause and the
Conditional Spending Power
The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall have Power to... provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States .... ,1" The historical interpreta-
tion of the Spending Clause centered on two theories.14 One view, advo-
7. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text.
8. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
9. Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1108-09.
10. Id. at 1104.
11. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
12. 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
14. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (5th
ed.) § 907, 662. See also Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1122.
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cated by James Madison, construed the clause as authorizing
congressional spending only in furtherance of federal powers conferred
elsewhere in the Constitution. 5 The other interpretation, espoused by
Alexander Hamilton, viewed the clause as conferring a power separate
from those otherwise enumerated, subject only to the requirement that
the spending be for general, as opposed to particular, purposes. 16
In United States v. Butler,7 the Supreme Court endorsed the
Hamiltonian view while considering, for the first time, a constitutional
challenge to a federal appropriation. 8 The statute at issue, the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1933,19 sought to stabilize farm prices by offer-
ing subsidies to farmers on the condition that they agree to reduce
production.20
The Court held that the Act was beyond Congress' commerce clause
power2 but that the asserted "general welfare" justification necessitated
an interpretation of the Spending Clause.22 The Court reasoned that be-
cause the power to spend is inextricably bound to the taxing power, the
former must be as broad in scope as the latter in order to achieve the
purposes of the tax.21 Therefore, the Court found, "the powers of Con-
gress to authorize expenditure of public monies for public purposes is not
limited by direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution."'
The Butler Court then prescribed two principal restrictions on fed-
eral appropriations. 2  First, Congress may not use the independent
15. The Federalist No. 41, at 326-28 (J. Madison) (J. Hamilton, ed. 1904); see also United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
16. See Hamilton, Report on Manufactures to the House of Representatives excerpted in M.
WALLACE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT, 155-56 (2nd ed. 1965). See also
Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66; LPTRIBE, supra note 5, at 322.
17. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
18. The Court noted, "We are referred to numerous types of federal appropriation which
have been made in the past.... [S]uch expenditures have not been challenged because no
remedy was open for testing their constitutionality in the courts." Id at 73.
19. Act of May 12, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 601 et seq. (1982)).
20. 7 U.S.C. §§ 608-612 (1982). See also Butler, 297 U.S. at 54-59; Rosenthal, supra note
1, at 1113.
21. Because the purpose of the Act-regulation of agriculture-was deemed to be "a
purely local activity," the Court found it could not be justified under the Commerce Clause.
Butler, 297 U.S. at 63-64. Subsequent expansion of the commerce power might well produce a
different conclusion today. See South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2801 (O'Connor, J. dis-
senting); Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1126 n.105; L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 310-18.
22. 297 U.S. at 62.
23. Id at 65.
24. Id at 66.
25. The Agricultural Adjustment Act worked through individual contracts rather than an
express condition on funds for the entire program; the Butler court thus stated it was "not here
concerned with the conditional appropriation of money nor with a provision that if certain
conditions are not complied with, the appropriation shall no longer be available." Id at 73.
The distinction, however, between funds subject to explicit conditions and those contingent
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spending power to accomplish objectives that could not be achieved
through its regulatory powers.26 The plan to stabilize farming concerned
"a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government."27
The Act was therefore invalid as an intrusion upon "the reserved rights
of the states ' 28 as secured under the Tenth Amendment.29 Second, the
Court condemned federal grants that take advantage of a recipient's eco-
nomic condition. The Act granted benefits to cooperative farmers while
withholding benefits from farmers who refused to contract with the gov-
ernment. In the Court's view this plan constituted an attempt "to
purchase a compliance which the Congress is powerless to command."3
The farmers' apparent cooperation was thus a product of "coercion by
economic pressure, 31 an inappropriate use of the spending power.32
Butler is the only case in which the Supreme Court has invalidated a
conditional grant on the grounds that it exceeds Congress' spending
power.33 Subsequent challenges to conditional federal grants frequently
centered on allegations of unconstitutional congressional intrusion into
states' rights34 and de facto coercion of fund recipients. 35  Succeeding
upon the assumption of a contractual obligation does not appear relevant to the limits imposed
on the spending power. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
26. The Court stated unequivocally:
It is an established principle that the attainment of a prohibited end may not be
accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers which are granted ..
Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by
the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not indirectly accom-
plish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance.
Id. at 68, 74.
27. Id. at 68; see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
28. 297 U.S. at 68.
29. The Court noted that the federal government is limited to its enumerated powers and
that the Tenth Amendment was adopted "[t]o forestall any suggestion to the contrary." Id
30. Id at 70.
'31. Id at 71.
32. Id at 70-72. "At best," the majority concluded, "[this statute] is a scheme for
purchasing with federal funds submission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to the
states." Id at 72.
33. Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1126.
34. See eg., State of Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127
(1947). Oklahoma concerned a challenge to the Hatch Political Activity Act, which imposed a
partial forfeiture of federal funding on any recipient state program that did not terminate its
politically active employees or officers. Oklahoma asserted that a federal act requiring forfei-
ture of funding or state office intruded upon state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 142.
35. See e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). In Steward Machine,
the plaintiff challenged a provision of the Social Security Act in which Congress levied a tax to
fund a national unemployment program but allowed up to a 90% tax credit for payments by
employers into a federally approved state unemployment program. The Court noted, "The
assailants of the statute say that its dominant end and aim is to drive the state legislatures
under the whip of economic pressure into -the enactment of unemployment compensation laws
at the bidding of the central government." Id. at 587.
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decisions effectively loosened the Butler restrictions by rejecting the tenth
amendment challenge36 and disparaging charges of federal economic
pressure.37
Although questions of state autonomy and economic coercion have
frequently dominated Supreme Court decisions on conditional spend-
ing,3 1 the Court has also recognized the importance of finding a reason-
able relationship between the attached conditions and the purposes of the
spending program. Both State of Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
Commission3 9 and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis' acknowledged a rea-
sonable relationship criterion, but neither of these decisions turned on
this issue or sought to elaborate on its parameters.4 1
36. The Oklahoma Court summarily disposed of the Butler protection against conditions
designed to achieve objectives beyond Congress' regulatory power: "While the United States is
not concerned and has no power to regulate local political activities as such of state officials, it
does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed."
330 U.S. at 143. Accord Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S.
256, 269-70 (1985) (utilizing conditional spending rationale to overrule state law on federal
money distribution); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 565-69 (1974) (relying on conditional
spending provision to compel English language instruction); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropol-
itan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. at 528, 552-54 (analyzing conditions attendant on federal funds
and questions of state sovereignty with respect to the Commerce Clause).
37. The Court in Steward Machine found nothing in the statute there at issue, see supra
note 35, to suggest "a power akin to undue influence," 301 U.S. at 590. The Court recognized
a congressional intent to induce state unemployment programs through the tax rebate but
refused to go further: "[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to
plunge the law in endless difficulties." Id at 589-90. See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937) (companion case) (upholding Titles II and VIII of the same act, which imposed taxes to
support old age pensions). Although Steward Machine concerned the power to tax rather than
the correlative power to spend, the decision has been accepted as authority on the issue of
coercive federal conditions generally. See eg., South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2798. See
also Note, supra note 5, at 302.
38. See supra notes 35-37.
39. 330 U.S. at 143. The Court cited United States v. Darby 312 U.S. 100 (1940), to the
effect that the Tenth Amendment cannot limit conditions "appropriate and plainly adapted to
the permitted end" of the spending program. Id at 124.
40. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). The Court distinguished conditional taxes where "the conduct
to be stimulated or discouraged is unrelated to the fiscal need subserved by the tax, or any
other end legitimately national." Id at 591.
41. In Oklahoma the employee termination condition of the Hatch Act, see supra note 34,
was deemed to be reasonable in order to ensure that federal funds would not be misused by
politically partisan state employees. 330 U.S. at 143. Congress' criteria for a tax credit in
Steward Machine had a similar purpose: "to give assurance to the federal government that the
moneys granted... will be used in the administration of genuine unemployment compensation
laws." 301 U.S. at 578. See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
In Ivanhoe the Court stated that "the Federal Government may establish and impose reason-
able conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof."
Id. at 295. Ivanhoe concerned federal funding for an agricultural water project that imposed
the condition that farmers limit the land receiving project water to 160 acres. The Court found
both the condition and the objective to be in harmony within a measure "designed to benefit
people, not land." Id at 297.
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II. The Minimum Drinking Age Condition:
South Dakota v. Dole
A. The Road to the Supreme Court
South Dakota v. Dole4 2 concerned a controversial condition on the
receipt of federal highway funds. In 1958 Congress passed the first com-
prehensive plan for federal assistance in the "construction, reconstruc-
tion, or improvement" of the nation's highway system.43 Pursuant to
this plan, the Highway Improvement Act of 1982 authorized federal
highway expenditures of more than fifteen billion dollars over four
years."4
In July, 1984, Congress amended the statute to condition five per
cent of any state's highway fund apportionment on its establishing a min-
imum drinking age of twenty-one by October 1, 1986.4 1 The percentage
withheld doubled to ten percent for any state that did not comply before
October 1, 1987.46 The amendment, entitled "National Minimum
Drinking Age," (NMDA)4 7 was passed in response to a growing concern
over teenage drunk driving. Congress had found that young people, un-
derage in their own states, would cross the border to drink in less restric-
tive neighboring states and would then drive back, sometimes while
42. 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987).
43. Pub. L. No. 85-767, § 1, 72 Stat. 885 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (1958)).
Title 23 established a cooperative scheme in which the federal government matches state funds
expended for highways at roughly a three-to-one ratio. DOLE & BARNHART, HIGHWAY STA-
TISTICS SUMMARY TO 1985, 54 (1986). Congress authorizes funds to be expended for high-
ways, and the states make actual expenditures to contractors. The government then
reimburses each state for the federal share of a project's cost. Id at 55. Funds expended in
this program comprise a substantial portion of all federal grants to states. In 1985, for exam-
ple, the federal funds expended in this manner totalled over twelve-and-a-half billion dollars.
Id at 118, Table FA-206.
44. Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2099-2113 (1983). The Highway Improvement Act en-
compasses the first title of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
424, 96 Stat. 2097-2200 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.) Section 105 of
the Highway Improvement Act appropriates fifteen billion seven hundred fifty million dollars
($15,750,000,000) for expenditure from 1983 through 1988.
45. National Minimum Drinking Age, Pub L. No. 98-363, § 6(a), 98 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1986)). Although the National Minimum Drinking Age statute
was enacted as an amendment to the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, see supra
note 44, the withholding provision affects any funds apportioned to the states for expenditure
on the Federal-aid primary system, Federal-aid secondary system, Interstate system, and Fed-
eral-aid to urban system. See infra note 119; see also 23 U.S.C. §§ 104(b)(1), 104(b)(2),
104(b)(5), 104(b)(6)(1982). Three billion nine hundred million dollars ($3,900,000,000) of the
funds appropriated in the Highway Improvement Act were subject to National Minimum
Drinking Age withholding.
46. 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). See infra note 119.
47. Id
SOUTH DAKOTA V DOLE
intoxicated.48 Congress concluded that a uniform drinking age of
twenty-one would eliminate this temptation for teenagers to drink and
drive.49 Since direct federal control over the sale of alcohol within a
state's borders appears to be precluded by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment5 0 Congress relied on the conditional spending power to further this
objective.
At the time NMDA was passed, South Dakota allowed persons
aged nineteen or older to purchase beer containing 3.2 percent alcohol. 1
The federal penalty for the state's failure to rescind this privilege as to
persons under twenty-one was projected at four million dollars in 1987
and eight million dollars in 1988.52 The district court dismissed South
Dakota's complaint,5 3 however, and the state failed on appeal to the
Eighth Circuit.5
4
South Dakota had raised two principal contentions. First, the state
argued that the Twenty-first Amendment gives the states exclusive con-
trol over "[t]he transportation or importation into any State... for deliv-
ery or use therein of intoxicating liquors"55 through an express grant of
authority. 6 This constitutional authority, the state asserted, prevents
Congress from enacting a national minimum drinking age statute or, al-
ternatively, makes the state drinking age statute pre-emptive. 7 Second,
South Dakota argued that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress
from using its spending power to intrude in this area of state
48. See, eg., 130 CoNG. REc. 58228 (daily ed. June 26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mitch-
ell); id. at 58239 (statements of Sens. Bradley and Biden), id at 58241 (statements of Sens.
Huddleston and Hollings); 130 CoNG. REc. H5395 (daily ed. June 1, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Anderson); id at H5398 (statement of Rep. Barnes); idL at H5402 (statements of Reps. Coats
and Porter).
49. Id
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2, states, "The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." See also California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980) ("The Twenty-first
Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over ... how to structure the liquor
distribution system."). See South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628, 634 (1986), cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 567 (1986) ("In fact, the [drinking age amendment] necessarily recognizes the state's
power to reject Congress' judgment and adopt and legally maintain any drinking age it
chooses.").
51. S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN., § 35-6-27 (1986).
52. Dole, 791 F.2d at 630.
53. The United States District Court for South Dakota granted Secretary Dole's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12
(b)(6). The court found that the Tenth Amendment did not prevent indirect use of the spend-
ing power and that NMDA did not conflict with the state's rights under the Twenty-First
Amendment. South Dakota v. Dole, No. Civ. 84-5137 (D.S.D. May 3, 1985).
54. Dole, 791 F.2d at 634.
55. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI, § 2. See supra note 50.
56. Dole, 791 F.2d at 632.
57. Id. at 632-33.
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sovereignty.58
The Eighth Circuit rejected South Dakota's contentions by distin-
guishing Congress' authority to regulate from its authority to impose
conditions on the disbursal of federal funds. The court interpreted the
Twenty-first Amendment very narrowly, stressing that congressional
power under the Spending Clause "without question includes the author-
ity to attach conditions to the receipt and further expenditure of federal
funds." 9 Thus, a conditional appropriation such as NMDA does not
exceed federal constitutional authority, the court reasoned, because the
statute "falls within the scope of Congress's spending power."' The
court also noted that "to the extent a state finds the conditions attached
by Congress distasteful, the state has available to it the simple expedient
of refusing to yield.'
The United States Supreme Court granted South Dakota's petition
for a writ of certiorari, 62 prompting one scholar to hope that "[t]he Court
[would] avoid expressing any sweeping generalities as to [Congress']
power, or lack of it, to regulate by spending what could not be regulated
directly."63
B. General Limits and Broad Pronouncements: The View of the
Supreme Court Majority
Six justices joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in affirming the decision
of the lower court.64 After rejecting the argument that NMDA exceeds
congressional authority, the majority assembled four "general restric-
tions" that limit federal conditional spending.65
Chief Justice Rehnquist first disposed of South Dakota's contention
that NMDA constituted an intrusion into the reserved power of the state
to set its own minimum drinking age. The Court distinguished indirect
action under the spending power from the direct federal regulation ar-
58. Id. at 634.
59. Id. at 631. The court stated, "Specifically, the primary intent of the twenty-first
amendment was to authorize the state (where it would otherwise be prohibited from doing so)
to regulate directly the transportation or importation of liquor into the state.... in effect, to
create 'an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause."' (citations omitted).
Id. at 633.
60. Id at 634.
61. Id. See also Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n., 330 U.S. 127, 143-44
(1947).
62. Petition for Writ of certiorari to U.S. Supreme Court filed August 18, 1986 (No. 86-
260), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986).
63. Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1137 n.148.
64. South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2795. Joining the Chief Justice were Justices White,
Powell, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia.
65. The majority consolidated "several general restrictions articulated in [previous]
cases." Id. at 2796.
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guably precluded by the Twenty-first Amendment:
66
[W]e need not decide in this case whether [the Twenty-first]
Amendment would prohibit an attempt by Congress to legislate
directly a national minimum drinking age. Here, Congress has ac-
ted indirectly under its spending power to encourage uniformity in
the States' drinking ages. As we explain below, we find this legisla-
tive effort within constitutional bounds even if Congress may not
regulate drinking ages directly.67
This distinction between permissible indirect action under the spending
power and impermissible congressional regulation in an area reserved to
the states was applied to South Dakota's tenth amendment argument as
well. The Court noted later in its discussion "that a perceived Tenth
Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs [does]
not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on
federal grants."' 6 The Court made it clear that South Dakota's challenge
to the "relatively mild encouragement" ' 69 proffered by Congress cannot
succeed on the theory that NMDA represents unconstitutional federal
regulation.
The Court did, however, present four "general restrictions" that
limit federal conditional spending.70 The first limitation arises from the
language of the Spending Clause itself: any federal expenditure must be
for "the general welfare."'" Second, when Congress conditions an appro-
priation, it "must do so unambiguously" so that the state can exercise its
choice to comply or refuse with full knowledge of the consequences.72
Third, the Court declared that "other constitutional provisions may
provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds. '73
Citations in support of this principle refer to dicta in three decisions,74
none of which defines the principle.7" Nevertheless, by endorsing this
66. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
67. Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
68. aI. at 2797. The Court specifically considers the Tenth Amendment in the context of
its discussion of the "independent constitutional bar" limitation. See infra notes 73-79 and
accompanying text.
69. Id. at 2798.
70. Id at 2796. See supra note 65.
71. Id., quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
72. Id., quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1980).
73. Id at 2796-97.
74. The Court cites Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256
(1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); and King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
75. Lawrence County involved a condition requiring local control over federal funds; the
Court there mentioned the independent bar and cited King v. Smith but did not discuss or
apply the principle. 469 U.S. at 269-70. King addressed a state regulation conditioning an
individual's receipt of federal funds and provided no further elaboration on what constitutes a
"controlling constitutional prohibition." 392 U.S at 333 n.34. In Buckley v. Valeo the Court
considered an attack on a federal campaign finance act based on the General Welfare Clause.
Summer 19881 SOUTH DAKOTA V DOLE
658 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 15:649
restriction, the Court appeared to sustain South Dakota's contention that
the Twenty-first Amendment bars the NMDA.76
The majority, however, rejected South Dakota's argument. The
Court concluded that the "constitutional bar" restriction does not refer
to other articles or amendments that may appear to prohibit directly the
conditional use of the spending power. 7 "Instead," the Court explained,
"we think that the language in our earlier opinions stands for the unex-
ceptional proposition that the power may not be used to induce the States
to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional."78 The
NMDA does not require such misconduct by the states; state compliance
with the drinking age condition "would not violate the constitutional
rights of anyone."
79
The fourth limitation requires that the condition have a "related-
ness" or "germaneness" to the program to which it is attached. 0 The
Court's language does not so much define this restriction as imply it by
referring to earlier cases that "have suggested (without significant elabo-
ration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs.' "81
This "relatedness" requirement received only scant attention from
the majority. The Court concluded that by admitting NMDA addressed
a problem of national concern, South Dakota had conceded the "ger-
maneness" or "relatedness" issue.82 Despite the assertion that "the
The Court acknowledged that limits on the Spending Power must be found "elsewhere in the
Constitution," but neither found one nor discussed what restrictions might exist. 424 U.S. at
91.
76. The state argued that although Congress may have imposed conditions beyond its
legislative power in the past, "[iln this case, Congress seeks to impose a condition when the
power to legislate has been withdrawn from it by the Constitution." See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 65, at 22 (emphasis added). Thus, the Twenty-first Amendment's ex-
plicit grant of power to the states bars any congressional action in the area of state drinking
age. Id.; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
77. The Court observed that "the 'independent constitutional bar' limitation on the
spending power is not, as petitioner suggests, a prohibition on the indirect achievement of
objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly." 107 S. Ct. at 2798.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Id. at 2797 n.3.
81. Id. at 2796, quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978). The
"relatedness" limitation was also the only restriction not mentioned in the Court of Appeals
summary of precedent. See Dole, 791 F.2d at 631.
The majority's observation that this factor lacked "significant elaboration" in the earlier
cases suggests that the Court might prefer that the relationship between a condition on the
receipt of funds and the federal interest served by the program meet an articulable standard.
Such a limitation could significantly reduce the scope of Congress' conditional spending
power. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
82. The Court noted that "the State itself, rather than challenging the germaneness of the
condition to federal purposes, admits that it 'has never contended that the congressional action
SOUTH DAKOTA V DOLE
[drinking age] condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of
the main purposes for which highway funds are expended-safe inter-
state travel," 3 the Court disclaimed any authoritative ruling on the
scope of the "relatedness" restriction."
Thus the Court clarified three restrictions on federal conditional
spending and left one additional restriction undefined. Congressional
spending conditions must first serve the "general welfare," second, be
unambiguously expressed, and third, not induce the recipient state to vio-
late the Constitution. Although the majority offered a fourth limitation
concerning the relationship between the condition and the "federal inter-
est" in the spending program, South Dakota's apparent waiver of the
"relatedness" issue obviated further elaboration.
C. Problem and Proposal: The Dissent's Objection
In her dissent Justice O'Connor agreed that Congress can constitu-
tionally condition its appropriations and deferred to the Court's three
named restrictions on these conditions. She objected, however, to the
Court's "cursory and unconvincing" application of the "relatedness" re-
striction. 5 A drinking age condition might relate to highway funding if
the objective of the highway program were, as the majority stated, simply
was ... unrelated to a national concern in the absence of the Twenty-first Amendment."' 107
S. Ct. at 2797, quoting Brief for Petitioner at 52, South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987)
(No. 86-260).
The passage in question clearly expresses South Dakota's understanding that variable
state drinking ages contribute to teenage drunk driving and comprise a problem which is "big-
ger than the individual states." Brief for Respondent at 6, South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct.
2793 (1987) (No.86-260) (quoting President Reagan, 20 WEEKLY COMp. PRES. DOC. 1036
(July 17, 1984)). The states' admission of a national concern, however, does not appear neces-
sarily to waive the issue of whether a remedial funding condition bears a reasonable relation-
ship to the underlying spending program.
Justice O'Connor regarded the majority's view of South Dakota's "concession" to be a
misreading of counsel's brief and argument as well as poor support for the majority's holding.
107 S. Ct. at 2800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She observed, "The fact that the Twenty-first
Amendment is crucial to the State's argument does not, therefore, amount to a concession that
the condition imposed by [NMDA] is reasonably related to highway construction." Id.
83. 107 S. Ct. at 2797.
84. The Court stated:
Because the petitioner has not sought such a restriction ... and because we find any
such limitation on conditional federal grants satisfied in this case in any event, we do
not address whether conditions less directly related to the particular purpose of the
expenditure might be outside the bounds of the spending power. Id. at 2797, n.3
(citation omitted).
85. Id. at 2799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent acknowledged that the first two
restrictions, "general welfare" and clear choice, were "wholly unobjectionable" in the instant
case. Id. Justice O'Connor also stated she was "willing to assume arguendo that the Twenty-
first Amendment does not constitute an 'independent constitutional bar' to a spending condi-
tion." Id. (emphasis in original).
Justice Brennan also dissented, arguing that the Twenty-first Amendment precludes con-
gressional conditions based on a state drinking age. Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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"safe interstate travel." 86 Justice O'Connor, however, perceived the ma-
jority's characterization of this objective as overly broad, allowing Con-
gress virtually unrestricted power to condition highway funds:
When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is enti-
tled to insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled
to insist as a condition of the use of the highway funds that the
State impose or change regulations in other areas of the State's so-
cial and economic life because of an attenuated or tangential rela-
tionship to highway use or safety. 7
To illustrate, Justice O'Connor hypothesized highway grants conditioned
on a state's moving its capital, a condition justified by the safety interest
in reducing traffic congestion.88 Under a "safe interstate travel" ration-
ale, the dissent found this scenario "hardly more attenuated than the one
which the Court [found] supports [NMDA]."8' 9
Justice O'Connor then offered a new standard that could "draw the
line between permissible and impermissible conditions on federal grants"
by limiting the spending power to its literal constitutional meaning. 0
Because Article I, section 8 empowers Congress to spend, the concomi-
tant power to condition funds should be restricted to provisos on how the
money should be spent.9 ' This standard, Justice O'Connor noted, would
hark back to the Butler decision by eliminating those congressional con-
ditions that are truly regulatory in nature.92 The NMDA would be inva-
lid under this standard because the condition did not concern the
expenditure of the appropriated funds.93
III. The Dole Restrictions Applied and Analyzed
A. The Majority's Restrictions in Practice
The majority decision in South Dakota v. Dole both reiterated prece-
dent and purported to clarify the limits of the federal conditional spend-
ing power. However, the three restrictions the Court defined, "general
welfare," clarity, and constitutional bar,94 do little to check Congress'
86. Id. at 2797.
87. Id. at 2800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2800-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. Justice O'Connor's standard was proposed by the National Conference of State
Legislatures in their brief as amici curiae.
91. "Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare, it has the power to legislate
only for delegated purposes .... Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose
requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be spent." Brief of
the National Conference of State Legislatures as amici curiae at 19-20, South Dakota v. Dole,
107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987) (No. 86-260) (emphasis in original).
92. 107 S. Ct. at 2801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2801-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
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power to condition funds. The decision's simultaneous approval and
avoidance of the "relatedness" criterion suggests a deference to congres-
sional judgment whenever a spending condition represents a federal re-
sponse to a national problem.
The Court's quick dismissal of South Dakota's state autonomy argu-
ment 95 continues the Court's tendency since Butler to accord Congress a
broad conditional spending power. As the Court noted earlier in
Oklahoma, a congressional condition on the disbursement of funds is not
an exercise of federal regulatory power. 96 Consequently, federal spend-
ing conditions are not subject to the constitutional limitations imposed
by Article I, section 897 or by the Tenth9" and Twenty-first Amend-
ments. 99 Thus, a state's constitutional right to control its minimum
drinking age has no bearing, in the Court's view, on Congress' power to
condition its highway funding on state compliance with the NMDA.'"
Despite the condition's practical effect of inducing state compliance,0 1
Congress did not directly regulate the state's minimum drinking age by
imposing it.
The first of the Court's list of limitations simply applies the language
of the Constitution itself. Every congressional appropriation, including
the conditions attached, must serve "the general welfare."' 2 Once the
Butler court determined that this language does not impose legislative
boundaries on Congress' power to spend, 0 3 however, little was left in the
way of a "general welfare" restriction. Since Butler, no case has held
that a federal spending measure failed to meet this requirement."°4 The
majority in South Dakota v. Dole continued this tradition, further noting
that "the concept of welfare or [its] opposite is shaped by Congress."'0 5
95. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
96. 330 U.S. at 143. See supra note 36.
97. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
101. South Dakota's repeal of the chapter authorizing the sale of low-point beer to minors
effectively raised the state's minimum drinking age to twenty-one. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. ch. 35-6 (repealed by SL 1971, ch. 211, § 121; 1987, ch. 261, § 10, effective April 1,
1988) (1988 Supp.) The reluctance of the state lawmakers to raise the drinking age is specifi-
cally (and vociferously) codified. South Dakota's legislature voiced its strong objection "to
being forced to choose between loss of highway construction funds.., and loss of its right to
set its own drinking age." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN., 35-9-4.1 (1988 Supp.) The section
concludes with an automatic revival of the low-point beer chapter should "the provisions of 23
U.S.C. 158 [be] repealed, expired, or declared invalid by the United States Supreme Court
. . I"d.
102. Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2796, quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
103. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
104. Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1113.
105. 107 S. Ct. at 2797, quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 645. In her dissent, Justice
O'Connor noted:
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The requirement that conditions attached to expenditures be unam-
biguous limits the legislative form of the conditional spending power
rather than its substance. Any proviso that clearly defines the character
and consequences of noncompliance would satisfy this restriction regard-
less of the condition imposed.1 1 6 As a result, this clarity requirement has
little practical effect in limiting congressional exercise of the conditional
spending power.
Finally, the "independent constitutional bar" restriction invalidates
only those appropriations that require the recipient state to perform
some unconstitutional act. 107 In practice this limitation merely encour-
ages Congress to uphold the Constitution by striking down spending con-
ditions that require its violation. Ironically, South Dakota's argument
that the Twenty-first Amendment bars the NMDA failed the majority's
test because the Amendment itself grants to the states the power to regu-
late drinking age. As Justice Rehnquist noted, Congress cannot be con-
stitutionally barred from conditioning funds on a state's raising its
drinking age because state control in this area is explicitly
constitutional. 108
B. The Dole Majority and the "Reasonably Related" Condition
The majority recognized that "conditions on federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular na-
tional projects or programs.' "109 Thus, the fact that conditions in spend-
ing bills are not limited by restrictions on Congress' regulatory powers
"does not mean that [such conditions] need not be reasonably related to
the purposes of the spending program itself."110 A condition must bear
some reasonable relationship to the federal interest in the underlying
appropriation.
Within the realm of what constitutes a "reasonably related" spend-
ing condition lies the boundary between valid federal control over the
objectives of appropriation and arbitrary federal intrusion into matters of
independent state control. Although Congress' spending power is sepa-
If the Spending Power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of the general wel-
fare, . . . the Spending Clause gives 'power to the Congress to tear down the barriers,
to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole people,
subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed.
Id. at 2801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 78.
106. Cf Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("By insisting that
Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.").
107. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
109. 107 S. Ct. at 2796, quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978).
See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
110. Note, supra note 5, at 303.
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rate from its power to legislate,' t the magnitude and prevalence of fed-
eral funding inevitably pressures the states to subordinate the
autonomous exercise of their reserved powers to the federal policy objec-
tives furthered by congressional spending conditions."1 2 Congress' inter-
est in conditioning its grants in order to achieve the purposes of the
appropriation must be balanced against the states' right not to have in-
dependent policy decisions unreasonably burdened by federal funding
contingencies. This balancing of federal and state interests requires a
constitutional standard for defining when a congressional condition and
the federal interest in the appropriation are reasonably related.
South Dakota v. Dole presented an ideal test case for defining the
"reasonably related" condition. The facts manifest an interesting dichot-
omy. On one hand, federal funds helped to create the highways by which
teenagers cross into neighboring states where the drinking age is lower.
The federal interest in maintaining highway safety is threatened when
these teenagers drive back while under the influence of alcohol. 1 3 On the
other hand, every local concern that could conceivably affect the "safe
highways" objective should not represent an opportunity for Congress to
condition highway funds."I4 As Justice O'Connor hypothesized, an un-
checked conditional spending power could lead to manifestly intrusive
results.1" 5 Defining a "reasonable relationship" between a program and a
spending condition and clarifying the breadth of a "federal interest" in
this context would have helped to establish the boundaries of appropriate
congressional conduct in this area.'1 6
The majority's analysis centered on the goal of "safe interstate
travel" and the related benefits to be gained from a higher drinking
age.11 7 This discussion, however, did not take note of the actual appro-
priation to which the drinking age condition was attached. The amend-
ment was not added to funding for state safety or alcoholism programs
that are designed to combat drunk driving directly; it affected general
111. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
114. See Brief of amici curiae, supra note 91, at 23-24.
115. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
116. In reviewing the Court's pre-Dole remarks on this issue, one commentator has sug-
gested a dual standard for determining what constitutes a "reasonably related" condition.
Those provisos are proper that either directly further the "substantive goals" of the program
or control how the appropriated funds are to be administered. Note, supra note 5, at 308.
Unfortunately, this construct does little to clarify the relationship between condition and pro-
gram, since it permits conditions that are as general as a federal program's "substantive goals."
It does, however, implicitly ask whether "conditions [may be upheld] if they are intended
merely to carry out a 'policy' of Congress or of the federal government at large, but [are] not
sustainable as an implementation either of the spending or of any of the other powers of Con-
gress." Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1129.
117. Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2797.
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highway construction funds, 118 allocated for the "construction, recon-
struction, or improvement" of the nation's roads. 119 The NMDA does
not purport to serve any of these functions.12
Nonetheless, the Dole majority inferred a general congressional
commitment to "safe interstate travel" from the highway fund appropri-
ation, 2 1 and the justices viewed NMDA to be "directly related" to this
purpose. 1 2 Because a lower incidence of drunk drivers increases high-
way safety, the majority's reasoning would appear to approve any con-
gressional spending condition that decreases the number of drunk
drivers. Such conditions would be "reasonably related" to the "safe in-
terstate travel" goal of highway funding.'23 This "relatedness" rationale
could logically extend to any condition that affects highway congestion,
pollution, or even destination' 24 if a safety objective were advanced. By
ruling that NMDA and this spending program are reasonably related
under a "safe interstate travel" theory, the Dole majority allows Congress
a potentially limitless power to condition grants within a broad definition
of highway safety.
Despite its "directly related" language, the Court explicitly declined
to consider the potential scope of the relatedness requirement. 25 Thus,
evaluating the impact of Dole on future conditional spending cases is nec-
essarily a speculative endeavor. The decision's flat endorsement of the
statute, however, suggests a practical interpretation of the majority's po-
sition. For problems of national scope the reasonable relationship ques-
tion considers not the condition (higher drinking age) and the spending
program (highway funds), but rather the policy (safer highways) and the
118. Brief of amici curiae, supra note 91, at 23 n.39.
119. See 23 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1982) (Declaration of Policy); see also H.R. Rep. No. 555
97th Cong., 2nd Sess, 1-4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWs 3639,
3639-42.
120. Section 158 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Withholding of funds for noncompliance.-
(1) First year.- The Secretary [of Transportation] shall withhold 5 per centum
of the amount required to be apportioned to any State under each of sections
104(b)(1), 104(b)(2), 104(b)(5), and 104(b)(6) of this title on the first day of the fiscal
year succeeding the first fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1985, in which the
purchase or public possession in such State of any alcoholic beverage by a person
who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.
(2) After the first year.- The Secretary [of Transportation] shall withhold 10
per centum of the amount required to be apportioned to any State under [the surface
Transportation Assistance Act] ... on the first day of each fiscal year after the sec-
ond fiscal year beginning after September 30, 1985, in which the purchase or public
possession in such State of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than
twenty-one years of age is lawful. ...
23 U.S.C. § 158 (1986).
121. 107 S. Ct. at 2797.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
problem (drunk driving). 126 The extent to which the Court is willing to
interpret expansively a program's "broad policy objectives" 127 in order to
justify a given condition will most likely depend on the particular prob-
lem that condition is designed to remedy.128 In any event, the problem of
teenage drunk driving led the court to conclude that the "encouragement
to state action found in [NMDA] is a valid use of the spending
power." 129
C. The Dissent's "Reasonable Relationship" Standard
In her dissent Justice O'Connor endorsed a bright line standard for
determining whether a spending condition is "reasonably related" to the
underlying federal appropriation. The Constitution grants Congress the
power to spend, so the conditions Congress attaches to its appropriations
should relate only to how the money should be spent. 130 This proposal
would achieve several beneficial results. First, it would clarify the consti-
tutional rationale for conditional spending by rectifying the Butler
Court's contradictory interpretation of Congress' power under the
Spending Clause. Second, Justice O'Connor's "reasonable relationship"
test would assist Congress and the courts by providing a clear standard
for determining constitutionally acceptable spending conditions. Finally,
this definition of a "reasonably related" condition would promote the
interests of federalism by protecting state autonomy while preserving
Congress' power to spend for the "general welfare."
L Reconciling the Butler Limitation on Conditional Spending
After deciding that the spending power is not subject to federal reg-
ulatory boundaries, 31 the Butler majority held that Congress could not
use the spending power to accomplish objectives outside its regulatory
power.132 Both the Butler dissent and subsequent scholars pointed out
the inherent inconsistency in these conclusions. By ruling that the
spending power cannot be used to achieve objectives beyond Congress'
126. The dissent argues against the validity of the latter association in the case of NMDA:
It hardly needs saying ... that if the purpose of [NMDA] is to deter drunken driving,
it is far too over- and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because it stops teenagers
from drinking even when they are not about to drive on interstate highways. It is
under-inclusive because teenagers pose only a small part of the drunken driving prob-
lem in this Nation.
107 S. Ct. at 2800 (O'Connor, I., dissenting).
127. Id at 2796, quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980). But see infra
note 136 and acconpanying text.
128. Cf Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641-44 (1937) (describing plight of the aged and
unemployed to support the validity of the Social Security Act).
129. 107 S. Ct. at 2799.
130. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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legislative power, the Court imposed limitations on conditional spending
that its interpretation of the Spending Clause necessarily released.133 If
the power to condition funds comes from the independent power to
spend, the conditions imposed should be similarly unaffected by Con-
gress' regulatory boundaries. Justice Stone's dissent in Butler empha-
sized that "the Court's limitation [was] contradictory and.., incapable
of practical application. The spending power of Congress is in addition
to the legislative power and not subordinate to it.' 1 34
The power to condition funds has no separate constitutional man-
date, but rather must derive from the Spending Clause. The purpose of
the Butler limitation was to identify those spending conditions that are
regulatory in nature and exclude them from Congress' spending power.
The genesis of the Butler contradiction, however, was in the court's at-
tempt to limit the scope of the conditional spending power instead of the
scope of the conditions themselves. Justice O'Connor's proposal avoids
this problem by requiring that a federal condition pertain to actual ex-
penditure in order to be justified under the Spending Clause. Conditions
that relate to the expenditure of federal funds are ancillary to Congress'
power to appropriate them effectively. Any condition that does not per-
tain to actual expenditure exceeds the independent spending power and
could only be valid as an exercise of federal regulatory power, attached to
but constitutionally distinct from, the spending measure. This rationale
does not expressly limit Congress' power to condition funds, but it does
effectively restrict conditions designed to achieve objectives beyond con-
gressional regulatory power.
2. Providing a Clear and Effective Standard
Justice O'Connor's proposal would provide a clear and effective
standard to aid congressional drafting and judicial consideration of fed-
eral spending conditions. As the magnitude and prevalence of federal
funding increases, 35 so too does the importance of establishing definite
parameters on the funding conditions Congress may impose. The dis-
sent's suggestion is clear and simple: provisions that direct how federal
money is to be spent are reasonably related to the underlying appropria-
tion, and those that step over this bright line are not. Judicial analysis of
challenged spending provisos would center on the statutory language it-
self, avoiding the speculative task of attempting to fathom the nature and
extent of a spending program's "objective."
133. Note, supra note 5, at 299-300.
134. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 85 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
135. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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3. Promoting Balanced Federalism
Most importantly, Justice O'Connor's proposal would preserve state
autonomy without curtailing Congress' authority under the Spending
Clause. Tying conditions to actual spending would allow Congress full
control over the agencies and methods of expenditure while restricting
the extent to which federal provisos interfere with state policy deci-
sions. 136 Under this standard the conduct required by a proper spending
condition would concern state management of federal property. 137 States
would have no right to spend or administer federal funds in ways con-
trary to congressional intent. Conversely, state activities unrelated to
federal funding or federal regulatory authority would not be subject to
congressional conditions.
Moreover, this limitation would not reduce the scope of congres-
sional spending because it would not foreclose any area previously eligi-
ble for federal funding. Although Congress would lose the considerable
power it derives from attaching loosely related conditions to its appropri-
ations, the leverage inherent within the power to spend would remain
undiminished. Congress alone would continue to decide what portion of
the ninety-six billion dollars goes where.' 38
The dissent's proposal would significantly and beneficially affect in-
teractions between Congress and the states. Instead of imposing condi-
tions beyond its regulatory authority, Congress would have to cooperate
with state policy-makers to achieve its "general welfare" objectives. Ide-
ally, such dialogue itself might further the nation's "general welfare."
Conclusion
Although the Constitution provides for a balance of power between
the federal and state governments, the states have become increasingly
dependent on the massive financial resources allocated by Congress. The
Constitution allows Congress to spend for "the general welfare," and the
136. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Congress appropriated funds
for local public works projects but stipulated that ten per cent of the appropriation had to be
spent to procure the services of minority contractors. The use of a condition on expenditures
did not hamper congressional control over the program, while it did serve to further the con-
gressional objective of ensuring public works jobs for minority business enterprises.
137. Appropriations that carry conditions concerning state administrative staff arguably
fall within the dissent's proposed standard. Conditions designed to ensure that federal funds
are not misused or misadministered by state employers certainly pertain to how those funds
are spent. See eg., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 143
(1947) (funding condition requiring abstention from partisan political activity); see also Tom-
linson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant in Aid Programs: Sugges-
tions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv. 600, 608-9 (1972) (discussing merit system
requirement for state programs administering federal Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren); Note, supra note 5, at 308.
138. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has held this spending power to be unfettered by the con-
stitutional limits on federal regulatory authority. Congressional practice
and Supreme Court interpretation have added the power to attach condi-
tions to these appropriations. The Court has held that the se provisos are
also unaffected by enumerated regulatory boundaries.
As state spending has increasingly become a function of available
federal funding, the expedient option of refusing these conditioned fed-
eral funds has become increasingly unrealistic. Because important fed-
eral grants may be subject to state compliance in areas that Congress is
not empowered to regulate directly, conditional federal spending has ena-
bled Congress effectively to circumvent constitutional limitations on its
power by purchasing what it could not command.
While the need to limit the conditional spending power has been
recognized in several Supreme Court decisions, only United States v. But-
ler evinces an attempt to do so. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
eroded the restrictions imposed in Butler and accorded Congress broad
power to accomplish its objectives through conditioned appropriations.
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court advanced four "general restric-
tions" on the conditional spending power. Congressional conditions
must serve the "general welfare," present the states with an unambiguous
choice, and must not induce the states to violate the Constitution. The
fourth limitation requires that the condition be related to the federal in-
terest in the spending program. The Court does, however, leave a critical
issue unexplored: the standard by which a condition and a program can
be deemed reasonably related. A proposal endorsed by Justice O'Connor
in her dissent would require that congressional spending conditions per-
tain directly to the expenditure of federal funds. Justice O'Connor's
standard would provide a constitutional rationale for limiting regulatory
spending conditions and would promote the reconciliation of federal pre-
rogative and state autonomy. Despite the dissent's valuable proposal,
however, the decision in South Dakota v. Dole represents a continuation
of the Court's previous approach and a lesson in missed opportunity.
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